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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
restrictions, 47 but it may nevertheless show a substantial trans-
formation.48 A subsequent zoning ordinance will not prevent en-
forcement of the plan if the development of the area is in sub-
stantial conformity therewith.49 Especially is this true when the
ordinance negatives any idea of interfering with the existing re-
strictions.50
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case, being in
accord with the great weight of American authority, was correctly
decided and the injunction properly issued.
J.C.W.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-INVOLUNTARY HOMICIDE STATUTES-
LOUISIANA CRIMINAL CODE-The defendant, while driving on a
public highway at night, accidentally hit and caused the death of
Robert McCrory. Evidence showed that only one headlight was
burning at the time of the accident and that alcohol was found in
the automobile. The defendant was convicted of the crime of in-
voluntary homicide, as defined by Act 64 of 1930.1 The informa-
tion stated that the defendant caused the death of McCrory "by
the operation and use of a motor vehicle, to-wit: an automobile in
a grossly negligent and grossly reckless manner, 1 ut not wilfully
or wantonly." The defendant argued that the allegation in the
bill that the act was not done wilfully or wantonly is contrary to
the charge of gross negligence and gross recklessness, because to
charge that the act is done in a grossly negligent and grossly reck-
less manner is equivalent to charging that the act was done wil-
fully and wantonly. Held, the words "wilfully" and "wantonly"
are not synonymous with words "negligently" and "recklessly,"
the former implying intention or deliberation and the latter mere
47. Burgess v. Magarian, 214 Iowa 694, 243 N.W. 356 (1932); Goodwin
Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W. (2d) 1024 (1938); Hayslett
v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888 (1930).
48. Goodwin Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W. (2d) 1024
(1938); Hayslett v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888
(1930).
49. Bachman v. Colpaert Realty Corp., 101 Ind. App. 306, 194 N.E. '783
(1935); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Drauver, 183 Okla. 579, 83 P. (2d) 840,
119 A.L.R. 1112 (1938).
50. Castleman v. Avignone, 56 App. D.C. 253, 12 F. (2d) 326 (1926); Bur-
gess v. Magarian, 214 Iowa 694, 243 N.W. 356 (1932); Kramer v. Nelson, 189
Wis. 660, 208 N.W. 252 (1926).
1. La. Act 64 of 1930, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1047] provides that
"any person who, by operation or use of any vehicle in a grossly negligent
or grossly reckless manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, causes the death of
another person, shall be guilty of the crime of involuntary homicide. .. ."
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carelessness or lack of due and reasonable care or disregard for
the rights and safety of others. State v. Vinzant, 7 So. (2d) 917
(La. 1942).
The majority of the courts agree that criminal negligence
must be something more than the negligence necessary for civil
liability.2 Generally, civil negligence is the absence of the care a
person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the facts and
circumstances. 3 The phrases "due care," "reasonable care," and
"ordinary care" are commonly used to denote the required stand-
ard of conduct to which one must conform in order to avoid be-
ing negligent. All jurisdictions except Texas seem to agree that
ordinary negligence is not sufficient for criminal negligence.,
There must be some higher degree of carelessness, which is ordi-
narily labelled "wilful or wanton"5 or "gross or culpable."8
2. Criminal negligence is gross negligence or reckless disregard of conse-
quences and rights of others, and not mere failure to exercise ordinary care.
State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P. (2d) 156 (1937). The mere fact that
one commits a civil wrong and accidentally kills another does not in Itself
render him criminally liable. Regina v. Franklin, Sussex Assizes, 15 Cox C.C.
163 (1883). Criminal negligence must be more than ordinary negligence; it
must be "gross, wanton, or wilful negligence." Jones v. Comm., 213 Ky. 356,
281 S.W. 164 (1926); People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 212 N.W. 97 (1927).
Criminal negligence must be "culpable" negligence. People v. Seiler, 57 Cal.
App. 195, 207 Pac. 396 (1922). Gross and culpable negligence will supply a
criminal intent. State v. Irvine, 126 La. 434, 52 So. 567 (1910). Ordinary negli-
gence alone is not enough. People v. Falkovich, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N.E. 398
(1917). Contra: Degree of negligence necessary to constitute manslaughter is
civil or tort negligence. Haynes v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. Rep. 42, 224 S.W.
1100 (1920); Young v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. Rep. 39, 47 S.W. (2d) 320 (1932).
3. Omission of that care which a man of common prudence usually takes
of his own concerns. Negligence is the failure 'to do what a man of ordinary
care and prudence would do under the same circumstances. Young v. State,
120 Tex. Crim. Rep. 39, 47 S.W. (2d) 320 (1932), cited supra note 2. Negligence
is failing to exercise degree of care which an ordinarily and reasonably pru-
dent man would use under like circumstances. Meredith v. Reed, 26 Ind. 334
(1866). Negligence is any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of
an Interest of others, which falls below the standard established by law for
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. 2 A.L.I., Restate-
ment of the Law of Torts (1934) 738, § 282. Unless the actor is a child or an
insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid
being negligent is that 6f a reasonable man under like circumstances. Id. at
741, § 283.
4. Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide-A study in Statutory Interpretation
(1936) 25 Cal. L. Rev. 1.
5. Although rejected by some courts and writers as involving a contra-
diction of terms, this phrase is occasionally used to describe a higher or more
aggrevated form than gross negligence. A wanton act is one done in reckless
disregard of rights of others, evincing a reckless indifference to the conse-
quences to life or limb or health, and is more than negligence, more than
gross negligence. Ziman v. Whitley, 110 Conn. 108, 147 Atl. 370 (1929). Wilful-
ness is such conduct as evidences a reckless indifference to safety. Comm.
v. Guillemette, 243 Mass. 346, 137 N.E. 700 (1923); Ashton v. Blue River Power
Co., 117 Neb. 661, 222 N.W. 42 (1928); State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 87 P. (2d)
454 (1939); Lee v. Hoff, 163 Ore. 374, 97 P. (2d) 715 (1940).
6. Gross negligence is substantially higher in magnitude than simple in-
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Until recently, all homicides resulting from criminal negli-
gence were prosecuted as manslaughter. However, juries were
reluctant to convict the negligent driver or handler of firearms
of so serious a crime; as a result, the reckless motorist was often
exonerated. Consequently, a number of states, led by Michigan,
now have statutes punishing such reckless or grossly negligent
killings as a special and lesser offense, usually designated as "in-
voluntary homicide."7 Under these special statutes, convictions
have become more frequent. Unfortunately, these statutes apply
only to cases of "negligent" operation of "vehicles." Most courts
find it difficult to make any distinction between involuntary homi-
cide and manslaughter, and some of them make no attempt to
do so.8
The Michigan involuntary homicide statute reads:
"... every person who, by the operation of any vehicle at an
immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or neg-
ligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly .... -
Louisiana now has a similar statute,'0 also containing the proviso,
"but not wilfully or wantonly." The Michigan courts have con-
strued their statute as requiring any negligence between slight
and gross negligence. They have interpreted "wilfully or wan-
tonly" to mean "gross negligence."11 On the other hand, most
jurisdictions have held "gross negligence" to mean something dif-
ferent from "wilful or wanton.""11 There is much confusion and
inconsistency in the interpretations of the terms in the involun-
tary homicide statutes, but it is almost universally held that these
statutes require something more than ordinary or tort negli-
advertence, but falls short of intentional wrong. It consists of a reckless or
Indifferent omission to do what a reasonable person would do, or a similar
reckless or indifferent doing of what such a person would not do under same
circumstances. Carbe v. State, 4 Ga. App. 583, 62 S.E. 140 (1908); State v.
Wright, 128 Me. 404, 148 Atl. 141 (1929); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass.
165 (1884); Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N.W. 972 (1911); State v. O'Brien,
32 N.J.Law 169 (1867); Nail v. State, 33 Okla. Cr. 100, 242 Pac. 270 (1926).
Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law (1934) 287, § 93.
7. Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) c. 380, § 16743; N.H. Laws (1931) c. 81, §§ 1-2;
D.C. Code (Supp. 1939) tit. 6, § 246a; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) §§ 5149, 5152. See
note 1, supra.
8. Lack of due caution and circumspection Is equivalent to criminal negli-
gence in manslaughter statute. People v. Hurley, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 208, 56 P.
(2d) 978 (1936).
9. Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) c. 280, § 16743.
10. La. Act 64 of 1930, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) H§ 1047-1052]. This
Louisiana statute has recently been superseded by Article 32 of the new
Louisiana Criminal Code (La. Act 43 of 1942).
11. People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 212 N.W. 97 (1927).
12. The terms wilful and negligent are inconsistent. State v. Porter, 176
La. 673, 146 So. 465 (1933); State v. Lockwood, 119 Mo. 463 (1894).
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gence.13 It may be said that criminal negligence is fundamentally
the same in kind as that giving rise to civil liability, the only dif-
ference being one of degree. A few courts hold that mere viola-
tion of a statute is criminal negligence, 4 while it is generally
held that violation of a statute alone shall not be sufficient to con-
stitute criminal negligence. 1 5
Similar to statutes in other states, the Louisiana involuntary
homicide statute was a little clearer than its Michigan pattern
and provided for punishment of "any person who, by operation
or use of any vehicle in a grossly negligent or grossly reckless
manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, causes the death of another
person." 16 In State v. Dean 7 the court declared "... 'gross negli-
gence' and recklessness should be interpreted to mean something
more, or a greater degree of negligence and recklessness than a
mere omission of duty, or a rashly negligent, careless, and heed-
less act." In State v. Linam 8 the court interpreted the same to
mean "excessive negligence, or negligence or recklessness of an
exaggerated character."' 9 These interpretations indicate that
''grossly negligent" and "grossly reckless" mean an appreciable
amount more than is ordinarily understood by the words "negli-
gent" and "reckless." However, the Louisiana decisions interpret-
ing the involuntary homicide statute had left important questions
confused and unsettled. In State v. Flattman'° the court in-
13. Criminal negligence is gross negligence or reckless disregard of con-
sequences and rights of others, and not mere failure to exercise ordinary
care. State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P. (2d) 156 (1937). It requires gross
negligence. People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400 (1914). There must
be gross negligence, I.e., a reckless or indifferent omission to do what a rea-
sonable person would do, or a similar reckless or indifferent doing of what
such a person would not do under the same circumstances. See note 6, supra.
14. People v. Gibson, 253 Mich. 475, 235 N.W. 225 (1931); People v. Beau-
champ, 260 Mich. 491, 245 N.W. 784 (1932); Haynes v. State, 88 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 42, 224 S.W. 1100 (1920); Young v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. Rep. 39, 47
S.W. (2d) 320 (1932).
15. The mere violation of a speed regulation does not, without more,
amount to criminal negligence. People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152
(1917); State v. Schutte, 88 N.J. Law 396, 96 Atl. 659 (1916). Driving at a
greater rate of speed than set out by statute shall be considered presumptive
evidence of negligence, but may be rebutted by proper evidence. People v.
Falkovich, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N.E. 398 (1917); People v. Anderson, 310 Ill. 389,
141 N.E. 727 (1923).
16. See note 1, supra.
17. 154 La. 671, 98 So. 82 (1923).
18. 175 La. 865, 144 So. 600 (1932).
19. The Louisiana court in State v. Wilbanks, 168 La. 861, 123 So. 600
(1929) declared that the violation of a safety statute was criminal negligence.
The following year this holding was overruled by an express provision in the
Involuntary homicide statute. La. Act 64 of 1930, § 4 [Dart's Crim. Stats.
(1932) § 10501.
20. 172 La. 620, 185 So. 3 (1931). Involuntary homicide, as defined in the
first section of this act, Is nothing more nor less than involuntary manslaugh-
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terpreted the statute to mean that the elements of manslaughter
and involuntary homicide were the same, and that it was to be
left to the discretion of the jury to determine for which crime the
defendant should be punished. State v. Porter21 and the present
case may be definite steps towards unraveling the confusion. In
State v. Porter the court distinguished between "grossly negligent
and grossly reckless" and "wilful and wanton. '22 In the present
case the court went still further, declaring that the words
"wilfully and wantonly" are not synonymous with the words
"negligently and recklessly," the former implying intention or
deliberation and the latter mere carelessness or lack of due and
reasonable care. 23 The court further explained that the crime of
involuntary homicide was a lesser crime than that of manslaugh-
ter, that the elements of involuntary homicide are "gross negli-
gence" or "gross recklessness," and that if the acts were "wilful
and wanton" the crime would be manslaughter or possibly
murder.
In the new Louisiana Criminal Code the draftsmen have hit
upon a simpler and more workable definition of criminal negli-
gence. Article 12 2 defines "criminal negligence" as follows:
"Criminal negligence exists when, although neither specific
nor general criminal intent is present, there is such disregard
of the interest of others that the offender's conduct amounts to
a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be
maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circum-
stances."
This definition is a simple statement of the generally accepted
concept of criminal negligence, phrased in language which should
not give rise to confusing and conflicting judicial interpretation.
ter, committed by the grossly negligent use or operation of a vehicle. All
the legislature did by the provisions of Sections 3 and 5 of Act 64 of 1930
was to leave it to the discretion of the jury, trying a person for manslaughter
committed by the grossly negligent use or operation of a vehicle to say
whether the penalty should be imprisonment at hard labor for a term not
exceeding twenty years, or imprisonment with or without hard labor, at the
discretion of the judge, for a term not exceeding five years.
21. 176 La. 673, 146 So. 465 (1933).
22. Ibid. Here the court explained that the clause "but not wilfully or
wantonly" written into Act 64 of 1930 immediately following the definition of
the crime, was intended merely as an exception, for most assuredly one who
causes the death of another wilfully and wantonly, as those words are used
in criminal law, is guilty of manslaughter or more. They constitute no ele-
ment of the crime of involuntary homicide. Accord: State v. Vinzant, 200
La. 301, 7 So. (2d) 917 (1942).
23. State v. Vinzant, 200 La. 301, 7 So. (2d) 917 (1942).
24. Art. 12, La. Crim. Code.
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It should also be noted that the Negligent Homicide Article2
in the new Criminal Code is broader than the prior involuntary
homicide statute in that it covers all negligent killings and thus
will include homicides caused by the grossly negligent handling
of a firearm or poison. It also follows a sound rule enunciated in
the old involuntary homicide statute by expressly providing that
"the violation of a statute or ordinance shall be considered only
as presumptive evidence of such negligence. ' 2 The congruence
of the present case and the new Louisiana Criminal Code creates
a supposition that there will be no further lengthy disputes about
the elements of criminal negligence or of negligent homicide in
Louisiana. For other jurisdictions, whose courts have been in
utter confusion as to the interpretations of the heterogeneous
terms and language of their negligent homicide statutes, it is sug-
gested that they follow the clear distinction now set out in the
present case and so ably expressed in the Louisiana Criminal
Code.
J.J.C.
ENCROACHING WALLS-BALANCING EQurrms-Plaintiff and de-
fendant acquired adjacent lots from a common vendor. Defendant
constructed a brick building on the property purchased by him.
Afterwards plaintiff decided to erect a building on his lot. When
a survey was made it was ascertained that the entire northern
wall of defendant's building, which was sixteen inches in width,
was located on plaintiff's land. Plaintiff sued to have the bound-
ary line established in accordance with a description of the prop-
erty and to have the encroaching wall removed. The court found
that the defendant had been fully cognizant, previous to the erec-
tion of his building, that such building would encroach on plain-
tiff's property. Held, under the provisions of Article 508 of the
Civil Code,' plaintiff had a clear and legal right to demand the
25. Art. 32, La. Crim. Code.
26. La. Act 64 of 1930, § 4 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1050] provides:
"In all prosecutions under this Act or under the manslaughter law, as it
now exists, whether or not the defendant is guilty of gross negligence or
gross recklessness shall be a question of fact for the jury, and shall not
depend upon the rate of speed fixed by law for operating such vehicle."
1. Art 508, La. Civil Code of 1870: "When plantations, constructions and
works have been made by a third person, and with such person's own ma-
terials, the owner of the soil has a right to keep them or to compel this
person to take away or demolish the same.
"If the owner requires the demolition of such works, they shall be de-
molished at the expense of the person who erected them, without any corn-
1942]
